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POLISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EU COUNCIL: 
REACTIONS AND OPINIONS IN THE US
US media coverage of the Polish presidency
Poland took over the Presidency of the EU Council on the 1st of July, 2011 and, pri-
or to this date, the Polish Embassy in Washington was busy long before this date to 
rise to the task of giving its support to Poland in the US capital. Poland’s objectives 
and achievements contained the following: six pack agreement (a packet of five 
regulations and one directive bolstering economic governance in the EU and Euro-
zone), Single Market forum in Krakow (which, with its declaration of 20 regulatory 
barriers that make the Single Market difficult, helped to deepen the work meant 
to foster economic growth), European patent, Eastern Partnership summit (which 
agreed that strengthening of the Eastern partnership is a necessity), establishment 
of the European Endowment for Democracy to make grants for local democratic 
movements, and successes in the common position on energy and environment 
(including the adoption in September of 2011 by the General Affairs Council of the 
European Union’s first negotiating mandate for the European Commission to hold 
talks with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on trans-Caspian gas pipeline and the UN 
climate talks in Durban). As these achievements did not directly involve the United 
States it is no surprise that they did not make major headlines there.
There were relatively few US media reactions regarding Polish Presidency 
in the European Council. Most comments relating to Poland’s rotating Presidency 
basically referred to the economic crisis in Europe and debate within the EU on the 
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future of the integration process. It is not unusual because EU stories in general are 
hard to make interesting for Americans. For example, not one of the main TV sta-
tions did stories on the “Yes” vote in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, de-
signed to update and consolidate the EU institutions. The US print media covered 
the story with reports which contained serious mistakes. This might be because 
when Americans set their priorities, they first think of problems they need to solve 
and except for the economic situation, Europe is not usually on the “problems list” 
and therefore not a priority.
In the very few US reactions, Poland was invoked however as an example 
of a country with a stable economic situation and the only EU country not to ex-
perience recession in the last 20 years, which helps Poland play a significant role 
in shaping the new economic governance. There seemed to be an emphasis on 
Poland’s actions aimed at stabilizing the situation in the euro area including the 
decision of the Polish government to provide additional financial support for the 
International Monetary Fund (designed to rescue the euro zone). This signaled to 
the Americans a fundamental change in the role of the “new” EU member states 
which are taking on the responsibility for the future of European integration and are 
ready to go beyond the role of just an aid recipient.
In the reports regarding preparations and results of the December European 
Council meeting, the head of the Polish government was quoted on the statements 
regarding European solidarity, strengthened financial security and fiscal discipline 
within the EU and on general Polish support for further integration of the EU. The 
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and several other major newspapers cited 
the remarkable speech given by Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorksi in 
Berlin, where he urged Germany to save the euro, claiming that “he feared German 
inaction more than German action.” In the Washington Post this statement was 
used to show the special position of Germany in the face of the economic crisis and 
the exceptional Polish diplomacy appealing for strong leadership of Germany in 
Europe despite painful historical experience.
American media has also devoted some time to the meetings of the ECO-
FIN Council in Wroclaw. There was criticism of the EU finance ministers to take 
concrete steps to combat the debt crisis accompanied by favorable evaluation of 
the actions by Polish Minister of Finance, Jacek Rostowski, who as a Chairman 
of the ECOFIN council, took the unprecedented step to invite to this meeting his 
American counter-part, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. In their analysis con-
cerning the negotiation on the new EU budget, American commentators pointed 
out the difficult task of the Polish Presidency, which must act on behalf of the 27 
member states to reach a compromise and at the same time protect the interest 
of their own country (for example, this relates to the possibility of reducing the 
amount of the distribution of structural funds and the cohesion funds where Poland 
is a clear leader in their use, as well as to the Franco-German efforts to introduce 
a uniform corporate tax rate across the EU. This would potentially reduce public 
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spending and the attractiveness of Poland as a place to invest, which in turn would 
be detrimental to the economic growth of Poland).
The reports relating to the internal EU matters concerned mainly Polish 
Presidency’s unsuccessful efforts to include Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen 
plan. US media considered that restrictions on the freedom of movement of people 
within the EU and the Euro zone are symptoms of clear decrease in the level of trust 
between the member states.
In the case of foreign and security policy, US media reported primarily on the 
active role of Poland in eastern policy. The Warsaw Summit on the Eastern Partner-
ship was referred to as the most important political event of the Polish presidency. 
The attention of the commentators also focused on the perspective of “European” 
Ukraine and EU/US actions towards Belarus. Poland was also seen as a leader in 
their efforts to sign and association agreement with Ukraine.
Polish Presidency certainly tried to be visible in Washington. It has orga-
nized several major cultural events and was a part of important meetings such as 
that of the EU–US Energy Council, where senior officials assembled in Washing-
ton, DC on November 28, 2011 in a meeting chaired by US Secretary of State 
Clinton and US Secretary of Energy Chu, EU High Representative Ashton and EU 
Commissioner for Energy Oettinger where Beata Stelmach, Poland’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Undersecretary, represented Poland’s Presidency of the Council.
There were also several important visits by high level Polish officials 
to Washington including that of Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Krzysztof 
Stanowski on Septemebr 23rd, 2011 and Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder’s 
visit on September 19th. Polish Ambassador, Robert Kupiecki, also made sure to 
meet with Ambassador Miriam Sapiro, Deputy US Trade Representative, to dis-
cuss Poland’s priorities during its Presidency.
What does the EU Council’s Presidency mean to the US after 
the Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty created a three-headed power. One head is that of the President 
of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, another is the High Representative 
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, 
who heads the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the last is José Ma-
nuel Durao Barroso, President of the European Commission. The three of them fre-
quently interact with the US on the highest level and the US administration admits 
that the Lisbon Treaty made it simpler for the US to work together with these single 
individuals in their permanent positions. This new institutional scenario has left 
a very small space for the presidential terms, not least with regard to visibility. The 
EU capitals, which continue to take over the rotating Presidency of the European 
Union every six months, are nowadays responsible for the bulk of the technical 
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work of preparing the European Council of Ministers. The Presidencies are great 
secondary actors and the Polish Presidency was seen as such in the US.
After the reform of the Lisbon Treaty, foreign policy had been removed from 
the Presidency dossier to fall within the remit of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and a post-Lisbon Presidency has 
significantly diminished the role of the prime minister of the Member State holding 
the Presidency in favor of the permanent President of the European Council. Yet, 
the rules of cooperation with the rotating Presidency in a number of areas where 
the competencies overlap are still being established and developing the framework 
for cooperation between the EEAS and the Presidency is still a difficult task. The 
EEAS service at the EU Delegation in Washington really took on a coordinating 
role. For the Presidency it means that they lost a front seat at the table but they are 
still a valuable partner. The path-searching of the EEAS did not make it easy for the 
Polish Presidency to find their place, but already under the Belgian and the Hun-
garian terms, many arrangements have been cleared up and the Polish Presidency 
understood better where it can support and balance the work of the High Represen-
tative and the EEAS.
In this new post-Lisbon system much depends on the attitude of the country 
holding the Presidency because, despite the new provisions, the Treaty of Lisbon is 
fairly vague with regard to the roles of the rotating Presidency in external relations. 
This entails that the first rotating Presidencies of Lisbon have the possibility to 
shape new roles in the EU’s external relations and this is what an ambitious Polish 
Presidency attempted to do. It tried to define the role of the Presidency by working 
out a way to collaborate with the High Representative although not in the areas 
directly related to the United States. Minister Radosław Sikorski and Catherine 
Ashton agreed on the mode of cooperation during the Polish Presidency before-
hand. The Polish Minister deputized for the High Representative in matters related 
to democratization in the vicinity of the EU and in matters of security and defense. 
He also represented her during the debates at the European Parliament and also at 
some international meetings. It remains to be seen however how the next Presiden-
cies will prove that the role of the rotating Presidency is still influential particularly 
as the field of external relations also includes issues belonging to exclusive and 
shared competences.
What is clear is that EU is still in transition and the Presidency’s changing 
nature is thus not yet fully developed. The rotating Presidency still has an important 
role to play but its influence has shifted more towards the EU’s internal level in 
terms of its important role of moderator and consensus-builder. The institution of 
the rotating Presidency still enjoys some procedural advantages, such as the cha-
iring of the COREPER II, however the formal leadership has been severely limited. 
Most of the powers rely now on the close cooperation with the High Representative 
and EEAS in order to have the Presidency’s priorities included in the agenda of 
the Foreign Affairs Council meetings and other working groups. Thus, the priority 
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shifted more towards using the inter-institutional relations, particularly with the 
increased role of the European Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty meant to create more 
coherence and consistency in the EU’s external relations and to a large extend the 
US Administration sees the changes as helpful in their interaction with the EU. The 
transitional period however shows that this new set up still requires more time and 
cooperation to be fully effective.
It is certain that Europe is complicated and that it can be confusing not only 
to the US because, despite of all the reforms, the EU’s institutional complexity re-
mains. Americans however want to understand the role of various EU actors such 
as the rotating Presidency and they do interact with them if they have the need. 
At the end of the day, all policy-making in the EU still depends on the consent of 
member states. The US is aware of this fact and continues therefore to need strong 
bilateral relationships with the EU member states and all the structural actors inc-
luding Presidency within the EU.
Abstract
Polska prezydencja w Radzie UE: reakcje i opinie w Stanach Zjednoczonych
Autorka prezentuje obserwacje płynące z analizy relacji amerykańsko-europejskich. Wska-
zuje, że amerykańskie media pilnie obserwują sytuację w Europie i są zaniepokojone kryzysem sfe-
ry euro. Obserwatorzy podkreślają, że proces globalizacji handlu powoduje, iż wszyscy partnerzy 
stosunków gospodarczych na świecie muszą bacznie obserwować powiązane wzajemnie reakcje 
międzynarodowych rynków. Należy jednak zauważyć, że Amerykanie są obecnie ukierunkowani 
głównie na obserwację rynków azjatyckich, przede wszystkim chińskiego, i nie stawiają proble-
mów europejskich na czele listy priorities – celów, które wymagałyby natychmiastowej reakcji. 
Amerykańskie media dostrzegają też, że polska stabilność ekonomiczna jest niezagrożona i Polska 
jest jednym z niewielu krajów EU, które pozostając poza strefą euro, wypracowały sobie reno-
mę kraju bezpiecznego dla zagranicznych inwestycji. Mimo uznania znaczenia polskich sukcesów 
w sprawach ekonomicznych, ze względu na typowy dla Stanów Zjednoczonych „amerykanocen-
tryzm”, amerykańska skłonność do badania zakresu polskiego wpływu na proces decyzyjny w Ra-
dzie UE, jest jednak niewielka. Amerykanie są skupieni na własnych interesach, a w zakresie zmian 
w Europie – zainteresowani głównie przekształceniami strukturalnymi UE po traktacie lizbońskim. 
Zakres wiedzy w Stanach Zjednoczonych o skomplikowanych mechanizmach sterujących Unią 
Europejską, a w tym również informacja o znaczeniu polskiej prezydencji w Radzie, pozostaje 
jednak niewystarczający.
